Totally shameless self-promotion here  . . . .  my article on executive compensation, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive Compensation, just published in the Vanderbilt Law Review. Cribbing from the abstract:

This Article argues that employees should serve as intrafirm monitors of executive performance and pay. Employees and shareholders, labor and capital, can monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders currently monitor performance and pay through the market mechanism of public disclosures and share price. Employees can add an effective layer of monitoring by leveraging private information. Employees possess the corporation’s entire information content; the assessment derived from this content would be relevant to the board’s assessment of executive performance and pay. Corporate employees are also a major constituent of the corporate system and our political society. Given that excessive pay has been linked to economic inequity, employee monitoring can also validate executive pay in the current social, economic, and political environment in which executive compensation and income disparities have touched public consciousness. The basic structure of such monitoring already exists in law, as seen in shareholder say-on-pay mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. Structured properly and achieved fairly as to senior executives, a non-binding employee vote would politically legitimize executive compensation and income disparity at both the firm and political levels.

Robert Rhee

Professor Rhee’s legal experience includes positions as a law clerk on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and a trial attorney in the Honors Program of the U.S. Department of Justice. He also has significant investment banking experience. He was a vice president in financial institutions investment banking at Fox-Pitt, Kelton (then a unit of Swiss Re) in New York, a real estate investment banker at Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, and an M&A investment banker at UBS Warburg in London. He has worked on public and private M&A assignments, distressed restructurings, private equity funding, and debt and equity issuances. He is an active writer and scholar. His articles have been published in leading journals including New York University Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Northwestern University Law Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, Notre Dame Law Review, Emory Law Journal, William & Mary Law Review, and Florida Law Review.

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